Inflation targeting is a forward-looking framework for monetary policy that has brought unprecedented transparency to the process of monetary policy. This paper aims to assess the degree to which the South African Reserve Bank's (SARB) Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has, since the introduction of inflation targeting, successfully communicated to the public its policy analysis, and, in particular, the expected future policy changes. This paper follows international literature (Rosa and Verga (2007), Ehrmann and Fratszcher (2005)) in constructing a numerical index that is used to reflect the information content of the SARB's communications, specifically the monetary policy statements that accompanied each of the MPC meetings since 2000. The information in these reports is translated into a five-point scale that reflects the policy inclination communicated by the MPC. This ranges from a clearly signalled inclination to ease policy at one end of the scale, to a clearly signalled inclination to tighten policy at the other end. Relating this index to subsequent policy decisions reveals the informativeness of the index and, by implication, the informativeness of the underlying monetary policy statements. This method allows us to judge, systematically, the degree to which the MPC has communicated successfully, and the evolution of that success over the past nine years.
Introduction
Communication is increasingly recognised as an essential tool for the implementation of modern monetary policy. Most modern monetary policy regimes, whether inflation targeting regimes or not, identify price stability as their primary objective and recognise that central bank transparency 1 and credibility are crucial to the attainment of this objective. As a result of the broad move towards greater transparency, communication has become part of any modern monetary regime. In order for monetary policy to effectively influence economic decisions, it must influence interest rates along the entire yield curve, but modern monetary authorities only have direct control over the repo rate (or equivalent) at the very short end of this curve. The decomposition of nominal interest rates into real interest rates, inflation expectations and risk premia, as given by the Fisher equation, shows that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) needs to manage expectations of the future real interest rate as well as inflation expectations if it is to influence nominal interest rates over longer horizons. As a consequence, managing inflation expectations is increasingly recognised as essential for effective monetary policy.
"For successful monetary policy is not so much a matter of effective control of overnight interest rates as it is of shaping market expectations of the way in which interest rates, inflation, and income are likely to evolve over the coming year and later . . . not only do
Communications about future monetary policy
The recent paper by Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan and Jansen (2008) , five of the most prominent scholars of central bank communication, surveys the theoretical and empirical literature in the field. They describe the compelling move towards greater transparency in central bank communication, which has the goal of improving the management of expectations. Additionally, the authors review the evidence on the contribution of central bank communication to the successful implementation of monetary policy.
According to Blinder et al. (2008) , central banks used better communication to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of their interaction with the broad public, including financial markets. From this perspective, literature on the success achieved with better communication can be divided into two strands: first, research about the extent to which the central bank "creates news" considers the impact of central bank communication on financial markets; and, second, research that considers the extent to which central bank communication "reduces noise" examines how these improve the predictability of its policy decisions.
Starting with the first strand, some international research (including Kohn and Sack (2004) and Reeves and Sawicki (2007) This literature has been influenced by authors such as Romer and Romer (1989) , who adopted a narrative approach -creating indices based on the examination of policy records -to measure the stance of monetary policy. By translating what the central bank communicates about future monetary policy into an index, it becomes possible to identify the direction (and the magnitude, if desired) in which the central bank intends to influence the markets. Ultimately, then, one can judge the degree to which this communication was successful.
Two approaches have been adopted in the literature, each offering different advantages. Some researchers, for example, Heinmann and Ullrich (2005) , have created an "objective index", which measures the frequency of coding words, whilst avoiding the use of judgement in the construction of the index. Other researchers -Rosa and Verga (2007) and Erhmann and Fratzscher (2005) -have created indices that entail some judgement or interpretation in codifying the communication of the central bank. Rosa and Verga (2007) argue that subjective indices are supported by hermeneutic theory. These indices can be used to investigate the information content of a central bank's communication, which in turn will enable evaluation of the consistency and effectiveness of the monetary policy communication of the central bank.
In South Africa there have been few formal studies of the extent to which the SARB creates news or reduces noise, and these have been limited, primarily, to evaluations of the predictability of monetary policy (Ballim and Moolman (2005) , Aron and Muellbauer (2006) ), or to the sensitivity of financial markets to macroeconomic surprises (Reid, 2009 ). All of these previous studies investigate the movement of market interest rates in anticipation of, or in response to, monetary policy action (an announcement of the monetary policy decision). This paper contributes to the South African literature through the creation of an index that will allow for direct evaluation of the SARB's communication on its possible future monetary policy stance through its regular monetary policy statements.
Method
The concept of consistency is explored comprehensively in section 4, but the assumption is that consistency (in the sense that the central bank's deeds match its prior words) is essential for building the reputation of a central bank. This is supported by Blinder's (2000) finding that central bankers and academic economists share widespread consensus that credibility is exceptionally important to a central bank 2 . In addition, both groups agree that credibility is built mainly through a track record of matching words with deeds -that is, through consistent policy decisions that are communicated to the public.
Monetary policy is a repeated game and therefore there are incentives for the bank to communicate in a consistent manner in order to be considered credible. The relevant commitment is not to any given path of policy decisions, but rather to the process by which policy decisions are taken. Svensson (2002) calls such a process a targeting rule, in contrast to an instrument rule, where a particular policy-reaction function is itself fixed.
However, Woodford (2003) offers further theoretical complication by showing that commitment to a policy procedure is inconsistent within a standard New Keynesian framework, except if the policy procedure has the additional characteristic that he calls a "timeless perspective". Policy with a timeless perspective is a decision rule that is optimal not only at a point in time, but one that would have been optimal in any earlier period, with the present knowledge of the transmission mechanism. From a timeless perspective the optimal policy procedure for the economy evolves with our knowledge of the economy and with structural changes in the economy. This paper evaluates the SARB's communication as a tool of monetary policy. To that end, it assesses the degree to which likely actions indicated in the SARB's communication was followed by policy action consistent with the prior communication. In other words, we evaluate the informational content of the SARB's communication, using a measure of consistency.
Monetary Policy Inclination Index
The analytical tool used to examine the consistency of the SARB's communication is a subjective index of monetary policy inclination, supported by the hermeneutic argument 3 of Rosa and Verga (2007) . However, Rosa and Verga start by forming a glossary of words and phrases that they use as a guide to their index. This was viable for their study of the European Central Bank (ECB) as the ECB uses a "very standardised form of language" (Rosa and Verga, 2007: 149) . On a number of occasions, the ECB president even explained his use of a particular term. The same approach did not deliver useful information in the South African case where, to the best of the authors' knowledge, the SARB made fewer explicit attempts to clarify the informational content of any particular word or phrase.
We created an index to capture the information (in terms of the direction of change) contained in the official statement after each Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting, with respect to the likely future development of the stance of monetary policy conveyed by the policy statement. Although the SARB uses a number of other communication devices, including monetary policy reviews and monetary policy forums, we focus in this study on the monetary policy statements released at 15:00, directly after the monetary policy committee meetings. The wide publicity attracted by these statements and their higher relative frequency were the important criteria in this decision, but the research could be extended to analyse the other channels of communication in a similar fashion. Apart from the formal channels of the SARB's communication, it might also be instructive to study the information content of other, more informal, communication such as comments by the governor at press conferences. Jac Laubscher (2009) recently argued that the governor's comments at a press conference provided valuable information to assist understanding of the MPC's surprising decision to leave the repo rate unchanged in June 2009, but lamented the exclusion of such information from the formal policy statement.
To limit the inherent subjectivity of the method used here, each MPC statement was read and judged independently by two researchers, each of whom assigned a numerical value between -2 and +2 to the statement, reflecting the monetary policy inclination communicated by the statement. Both researchers were asked to provide an overall index value for each statement, after considering the following themes in each statement: comments about headline and core inflation, and expected inflation (especially the SARB's own forecast, the BER's survey of inflation expectations and the break-even inflation rate from the bond market); comments about the business cycle and the output gap; comments about wages and labour-market pressures; comments about money supply; comments about external accounts; and finally, overall comments about the appropriateness of the monetary policy stance. Each researcher had to justify the index value assigned in terms of the aforementioned topics. Following their independent evaluations, the researchers discussed each report and their evaluations in detail to arrive at a consensus index value.
An index value of 0 suggests that the overall message of the statement is that the stance of monetary policy is unlikely to change in the near future (i.e. that monetary policy at the time was appropriate). A value of -1 was assigned when the communication suggested that there is a possibility of the interest rate being lowered at the following monetary policy meeting 4 , while -2 reflected communication that suggested an imminent easing. Similarly, values of +1 or +2 respectively represented communication of the possibility of an interest rate tightening, and an imminent interest rate rise.
For example, the MPC statement of 22 April 2004 was given an index value of 0. Although the statement comments on rising inflation, inflation was still within the target band and the expres-sions "the inflation outlook over the coming months as well as over the longer term continues to be favourable" and "domestically, most conditions seem to endorse the containment of inflation", suggest that the MPC judged inflationary pressure to be contained. The report's final section (subtitled, "Monetary Policy Stance") concludes that "CPIX inflation will remain within the target range during the forecast period while the economy should pick up momentum", which was interpreted as an indication that the MPC judged the stance of policy at the time to be appropriate.
By contrast, a value of -2 was given to the report following the meeting of 28 May 2009. The MPC had reduced the repo rate at the preceding four MPC meetings, and the following sentences add to the impression that, in terms of inflationary pressures, there was, if anything, an even stronger case for a further easing of monetary policy:
"The most recent CPI inflation forecast of the Bank shows a relatively unchanged outcome for the near-term as compared to that presented to the previous meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee. Over the longer term, there appears to be a moderate improvement [in the inflation outlook]." (SARB, 2009) With regard to output, the statement reports that "GDP contraction was broad-based" and "high frequency indicators suggest that the negative trend in GDP growth is likely to continue during the second quarter of 2009, although at a more moderate pace of contraction" (SARB, 2009). The following comment in the final section of the statement cements the authors' view that the SARB was communicating a continuation of its easing stance:
"The evidence which was presented to the Monetary Policy Committee suggests that the output gap has widened further. This is expected to contribute to an improved inflation outlook, notwithstanding some current inflation inertia." (SARB, 2009) The monetary policy decision following this statement (25 June 2009) turned out, however, to be a controversial one, and will be discussed in detail in section 4.2.
Application of the inclination index
The information content of the inclination index is studied from a number of angles, starting with exploratory data analysis and econometric tests, followed by OLS and ordered probit regression analyses. These techniques, jointly, will provide insight into how consistently the SARB communicates its intended future monetary policy path.
A challenge faced in the application of the inclination index is the fact that the horizons between meetings varies in our sample period. The dates of the MPC meetings and the resulting horizons between meetings are presented in the appendix. While the intervals between meetings differ, they have mostly been two months apart 5 , with a standard deviation of 0.58, suggesting that the range 1.5 to 2.5 months covers the majority (48 out of 62) of the intervals. The robustness of the regression results in section 4.2 to these changing horizons is evaluated by comparing the results of regressions using an "event horizon" to those using a "calendar horizon".
Consistency
In the literature (Rosa and Verga (2007), Erhmann and Fratzscher (2005) ), the term consistency is used to describe the degree to which the actions of the central bank correspond with their previous communication about monetary policy (their words). According to Erhmann and Fratzscher (2005: 7) , consistency is a "necessary condition if the statements are meant to help markets anticipate better future decisions", and Blinder (1998) argues that it is crucial to building credibility: "To me, that is the hallmark of credibility: matching deeds to words. . . . Credibility means that your pronouncements are believed -even though you are bound by no rule and may even have a short-run incentive to renege. In the real world, such credibility is not normally created by incentive-compatible compensation schemes or by rigid precommitment. Rather, it is painstakingly built up by a history of matching deeds to words. A central bank that consistently does what it says will acquire credibility by this definition almost regardless of the institutional structure." (Blinder, 1998: 64) 
Exploratory data analysis
Visual inspection of the indicator variable and the policy rate at subsequent meetings ( Figure I ) provides the first indications of the consistency of the SARB's communication. The shaded band highlights the values between -1 and 1 (as read off the secondary axis). When the solid black line representing the index moves above (below) zero, but is still within the shaded area, the SARB is viewed to be communicating upward (downward) pressure on inflation that indicates the possibility of future monetary policy tightening (easing). A movement of the index outside of the shaded area suggests an imminent policy adjustment.
Figure I
The grey line depicting the repo rate at time t+3, i.e. three months after the index value (measured on the primary axis), shows the actual monetary policy decisions over this period. For a central bank to influence market expectations about future policy adjustments, its communication should lead the policy adjustment. In Figure 1 this means that the movement of Repot+3 should be fairly closely correlated with the movements of the index. Positive values of the index should correspond with, or slightly precede, upward movements of the repo rate, although the differences in scale between the index and the repo rate imply that the shape and magnitude of the changes in the lines do not need to match in order to indicate that the index has information content.
It is important to recognise that central bank communication that merits an index value of 1 or -1, even if it never becomes 2 or -2, is a valuable part of the monetary policy toolkit, acting as a credible threat, if used consistently. Index fluctuations between 1 and 0 in 2000-2001 could simply reflect uncertainty, or learning by a then newly constituted MPC. However, if this kind of communication is understood by the SARB's audience to be consistent, credible, and conditional on the state of the economy, it could be used to manage inflation expectations. It would thereby contribute to price stability without requiring an actual monetary policy change -policy change which could impose other costs on the economy. Table II Transition matrices (Tables II and III) provide a more systematic way of evaluating this data to investigate the consistency of the SARB's communication. The monetary policy inclination communicated by the SARB is read horizontally in rows, and the actual monetary policy that transpired is read vertically in columns. Table II assesses the period 2000-2009, whereas Table  III evaluates In these tables, we interpret consistency as follows:
1. Strong consistency: the MPC adjusts the repo rate at its next meeting in a manner consistent with the index value, e.g. a +2 index value is followed by an interest rate rise and a -2 index value is followed by an interest rate cut.
2. Mild inconsistency: the MPC adjusts the repo rate at its next meeting even though the index value had shown only a risk of policy adjustment (e.g. +1 or -1) and not an imminent policy adjustment.
3. Strong inconsistency: the MPC adjusts the repo rate at its next meeting in a direction inconsistent with the present index value, e.g. cutting the repo rate following a meeting where the index value was +2.
From the first row in Table II it emerges that an index value of -2 was followed by a repo rate cut at the subsequent MPC meeting in three-quarters of the cases, while the repo rate remained unchanged in a quarter of cases. The latter is a mild form of inconsistency, in that the repo rate remained unchanged (the rate adjustment was not imminent). Communication with a value of 2 likewise achieved a high degree of consistency, with a repo rate rise following two-thirds of the cases where such a value is recorded. There was no evidence of strong inconsistency for index values of +2. An index value of zero (the value most frequently observed) was followed by a constant repo rate in two-thirds of the cases, and it is notable that of the seven interest rate adjustments that did follow an index value of zero, six were interest rate cuts. There were only three instances of a -1 index value, and in two of these cases the MPC cut the repo rate at subsequent meetings, keeping the repo rate constant in the third case. These cases present no evidence of strong inconsistency.
By contrast, an index value of 1 (the second most frequent index value) was followed by an unchanged repo rate in two-thirds of the cases, possibly capturing a baseline (or neutral) communication from the SARB, which warns against inflationary risks even when they are not imminent. This would certainly be a reasonable baseline for an inflation-targeting central bank, but it does mean that an index value of +1 should be interpreted as indicating a neutral stance with respect to the expected interest rate path. On two occasions (12 June 2003 and 12 August 2004), a value of 1 was followed by a cut in the repo rate, which indicates strong inconsistency. However, the first of these two can be explained by a correction of the miscalculated inflation figures by Stats SA, rather than by inconsistent communication from the SARB. The event on the 12 August 2004 is evaluated in further detail in section 4.2.
We can test formally whether there is any relationship between the index values in the rows and the subsequent interest rate decisions in the columns of Table II, using the Pearson test statistic. The null hypothesis in this procedure is independence, i.e. no relationship between the rows and columns, compared with an alternative of dependence. Rejecting the null hypothesis is evidence that the index value is associated in a significant manner with particular outcomes for subsequent interest rate decisions. The Pearson test statistic for Table II is 32.13, which is larger than the critical value of the appropriate chi-squared distribution with 8 degrees of freedom, even at significance levels as exacting as one-tenth of a percent. While these results suggest that there is a relationship between the index and subsequent interest rate decisions, it does not reveal the nature of that relationship, a question to which we return with appropriate techniques, below. Table III The data in Table III , representing the results for the period 2004 to 2009, is very similar to the full sample, with only a few exceptions. Communications awarded an index value of -2 or -1 were a little less likely to be followed by an easing of monetary policy than for the full period, and communications awarded an index value of 2 or 1 were slightly more likely to be followed by a tightening of the repo rate. Communications awarded an index value of 0 were more likely to be consistent (followed by unchanged monetary policy) and never to be followed by monetary policy tightening. Repeating the Pearson test for independence in Table III yields a test statistic of 20.43, which rejects the null hypothesis of independence very comfortably at a 1% level of significance.
Inflation surprises versus policy confusion
Buliø, Šmidkovã, Kotlán and Navrátil (2008: 9) make an important distinction between "inflation surprises" and "policy confusion". They recognise that a central bank's deeds can turn out differently from its prior words for two reasons: One possibility is that the central bank did communicate clearly, but that the macroeconomic environment subsequently changed in such a way that the Bank understandably had to depart from the policy direction communicated previously. Buliø et al. call such cases, "inflation surprises". Another possibility is that inconsistency between prior communication and subsequent policy might reflect poor communication by the central bank, so creating what Buliø et al. call "policy confusion". Careful study of the circumstances behind each apparently surprising decision is required to distinguish between these two cases. Table IV identifies occasions on which analysts and financial markets were surprised. The first two columns show the dates and interest rate decisions that were to some extent controversial. In the third column ("Reuters surprise"), the difference between the median of the Reuters Econometer forecast 6 for the repo rate and the actual subsequent monetary policy decision is used to identify when and in which direction the analysts were surprised. The fourth column identifies policy announcement dates on which the change in the Banker's Acceptance rate (BA rate), as a measure of whether financial markets were surprised, moved more than 0.25%. We used a threshold change of 0.25% to identify days on which the markets were substantially surprised. Using media reports to contextualise these surprises, potentially allows us to distinguish between inflation surprises and policy confusion.
The fifth column of Table IV shows the monetary policy inclination index for each of these decisions (the index value assigned at the previous meeting reflecting the policy inclination relevant to each decision). This column will help us to distinguish between "inflation surprises" (i.e. unanticipated changes in the economy) and "policy confusion" (i.e. policy surprises not attributable to inefficient communication, as opposed to economic shocks). The final column identifies those interest rate decisions that could be classified as instances of "policy confusion" based on this method. It should be noted, however, that this column is likely to overstate the instance of policy confusion (it is an upper bound) as the index is based on the monetary policy report alone, and disregards the other mechanism by which the SARB communicates with the public.
Table IV
Of the twenty interest rate surprises shown in Table IV , nine were identified as instances of "policy confusion", and two of these are readily explicable, as shown below: the unexpected reduction of the repo rate in September 2001 both surprised the markets and was not anticipated by the index, but should be classified as an inflation surprise due to a technical adjustment of the repo rate and the September 11 attacks on the World Trade centre, just prior to the policy decision. The technical adjustment of the repo rate on 5 September 2001 was aimed at improving the functioning of the money market in South Africa (SARB, 2001) and should therefore not be seen as an adjustment of the policy stance.
The June 2003 policy decision (which wrong-footed the markets and the index) was also an inflation surprise, because Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) acknowledged on 26 May 2003 that inflation statistics had been overstated for some time, resulting in a clamour for immediate repo rate adjustments (Loxton, 2003) .
We are left with seven instances of "policy confusion" out of 20 interest rate surprises and more than 60 policy meetings. Given that the method used in this paper is likely to overstate the number of interest rate surprises, the evidence suggests that the SARB has communicated its intentions about the future direction of policy with considerable success over the period studied.
The period between early 2004 and mid 2005 is interesting as the index reflects that the SARB's communication throughout that period indicated that policy would remain unchanged and that, if anything, the only fluctuations were warnings of possible future monetary policy tightening. However, during that period the SARB surprised the markets twice with repo rate reductions. These policy adjustments are classified as instances of "policy confusion", as the policy reports failed to prepare their audience for future interest rate decisions.
The international context for these surprises should not be forgotten: During the period from late 2001 until 2005 the Federal Reserve Board in the USA kept its policy interest rate (the Federal Funds Rate) at a markedly lower level than would have been suggested by an application of the Taylor rule -that had hitherto correlated closely with the Fed's policy stance ... (Taylor, 2009 ). While there is no suggestion of a simple relationship between interest rates in the USA (or elsewhere) and the repo rate in South Africa, the SARB had to weigh up the unusually large spread between local and international interest rates against the concomitant effects on capital flows and the exchange rate of its policy decisions during this period.
The first monetary policy surprise in this benign period is an interesting case, which illustrates clearly the need constantly to consider the actions and other communications of the SARB in the interests of protecting the institutions of monetary policy. In one of the instances of strong inconsistency, on 12 August 2004, a delegation of trade union representatives and management from the Chamber of Mines arrived at the SARB on the final day of the MPC meeting to hand a memorandum to the Governor "demanding immediate steps to weaken the currency's value" (Phasiwe, 2004) . Interrupting an MPC meeting to meet with a delegation intending to pressurise the committee was, with the benefit of hindsight, probably an error of judgment. It was doubly regrettable since the MPC surprised the markets by lowering the repo rate at that meeting (Laubscher, 2009 ). The confluence of a surprising repo rate reduction with an inappropriate accommodation of interest groups pressurising for just such a decision might have undermined the perceived independence of the SARB.
The media also lamented the lack of transparency surrounding the monetary policy decisions of June 2006, claiming that despite warnings of a possible rate hike by the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, the available data and the Reserve Bank's communication had not convinced the market that the threat was credible (Joffe, 2006) . However, our index value was at 1 for the June 2006 meeting, indicating that the MPC had at least flagged the possibility of a rate rise in its previous report. Laubscher (2009) , too, criticised the SARB for its unclear communication (as discussed in section 3.1).
Turning points
Some of the most challenging policy decisions which the MPC has had to communicate were the turning points of the policy cycles - with inflation surprises discussed in the previous section, so it is inappropriate to assign these to poor communication. However, the first turning point (14 June 2001) was clearly a substantial surprise to financial markets and was not predicted by the index (see Table IV ). The fourth (8 June 2006) surprised the Reuters panel, financial markets, and elicited media criticism (Joffe, 2006) . In this case, the index corresponding to this policy decision was 1, also indicating mild inconsistency. The final turning point (11 December 2008) is interesting in that it did not surprise the Reuters panel or financial markets much (it is therefore not identified in Table IV ), but the index did not predict the turning point at all (the index value was 0). In summary, the SARB has found it much more difficult to communicate likely turning points in the interest rate cycle, an unsurprising result given the inherent difficulty of the decisions involved.
Regression analysis
In this section, the approach of Rosa and Verga (2007) is adopted to begin a process of describing the information content of the index. Firstly, the change in the SARB's instrument rate (the repo rate) is regressed on the index variable, while controlling for the technical adjustment of September 2001 with a dummy variable.
The results of the regressions for m=1 to m = 6 (i.e. the change in the repo rate between time t and the repo rates one, two, three, four, five and six months later) are presented in Table Va . The estimates for the coefficient on the variable "index" should provide an indication of the relationship between the change in the actual repo rate and the index value, or the amount of information provided by the index on future monetary policy decisions. Table V The weak results for m=1 can be explained by the fact that most of the MPC meetings took place every second month, so there is very little movement in the dependent variable at t+1 (one month after the statement). From m=2 to m=6, the coefficient estimates of the index are positive and significant (increasing in size as the horizon lengthens), and the R-squared is between 0.328 and 0.351, which suggests that the index does indeed have informational content.
The coefficient on the index suggests that a statement which signalled an imminent monetary policy tightening (an index value of 2) was on average followed by 50 and 100 basis point increases in the repo rate within the following two and four months respectively. These coefficients are larger in magnitude than those estimated by Rosa and Verga (2007) for the ECB, which is unsurprising as the monetary policy adjustments by the SARB (in the context of an emerging market economy) are usually greater than those of the ECB. In line with the results of Rosa and Verga (2007) , the constant was negative and significant at all horizons, which could reflect that the communication tended to emphasise greater inflation risk (tendency toward monetary policy tightening) than what usually materialised.
As a robustness check, the regressions were estimated with alternative index values independently scored by Reid prior to consultation with Du Plessis. These results (shown in Table Vb) do not differ substantially from the combined index.
Secondly, OLS regressions using dummy variables for each of the five possible index values, rather than a continuous variable "index", were estimated to determine whether the values of the index displayed a cardinal or ordinal relationship. This will provide insight into how this index can be used appropriately in further studies.
Again, m=1 is uninformative due to the fact that most of the MPC meetings are two months apart. The regression outputs show that the coefficients on three of the index values (-2, 0, 2) are significant, suggesting that these values of the index contain fairly reliable information. The signs of the coefficients on the dummy variable for index values -2 and 2 are as expected, but the coefficient for the index value 0 is negative and significant (although much smaller than the coefficients for -1 and -2). This supports the interpretation following the regression using the continuous variable "index", that communications have a slight bias towards overstating the inflation risk.
Wald tests were used to determine whether the index was ordinal or cardinal in nature (whether a 2 (-2) reflects double the upward (downward) inflation risk that a 1 (-1) does).
The Wald test null hypothesis that β1 − β2 = β2 − β3, β2 − β3 = β3 − β4, β3 − β4 = β4 − β5 was firmly rejected at all horizons, suggesting that the relationship between the coefficients (different values of the index) is ordinal, but not cardinal.
This outcome and the fact that the index comprises discrete outcomes motivated the use of an ordered probit model to further test the robustness of the results. Due to the previous conclusion that the index values have an ordinal rather than cardinal relationship, this ordered probit contained the dummy variables for each index value, and the technical adjustment, as regressors.
The dependent variable in the OLS regression was the interest rate change over fixed calendar periods (2 months, 3 months, etc,). In contrast, the dependent variable in the ordered probit model is interest rate change between successive meetings, with these meetings spaced irregularly over the calendar. The consistent results for the two models show, however, that our inference does not depend on either of the two expressions for changes to the interest rate path. The ordered probit results were then used to investigate the number of type I and II errors that arose from the regression model. Table V   Table V summarises the predictive ability of the ordered probit model based on the index values described above. There are three rows in the table, each of which considers potential type I and II errors by the model with respect to the following predictions: an interest rate decline (in row 1), an unchanged interest rate (row 2) and an interest rate rise (row 3). The first two data columns show the proportion of true and false positives, e.g. in 71.4% of the cases where the model predicted an interest rate cut, an actual interest rate cut followed at the subsequent meeting. In two-thirds of the cases where the model predicted an interest rate rise, the MPC raised the repo rate at the subsequent meeting. The second column provides an empirical estimate of the model's type I forecasting error, and the highest type I error is 35% for the "unchanged" signal.
The final two data columns show the proportion of true and false negatives, e.g. in 83% of the cases where the model suggested there would not be an interest rate cut, the MPC did not reduce the repo rate at their next meeting, and in 89.4% of the cases where the model suggested there would not be an interest rate rise, the MPC followed suit. The final column is, therefore, an empirical estimate of the model's type II prediction error for the three relevant categories. It is encouraging that the type II error never rises above 32%.
Finally, it is notable that the type I and II errors are both highest for the model's ability to predict no change in the repo rate. An index value of zero should therefore be interpreted as indicating (i) that the MPC did not communicate a likely future change in the policy stance and (ii) uncertainty about the likely future policy direction. Positive signals, whether indicating a likely rise or decline in the repo rate, seem to have been communicated with greater accuracy.
Conclusion
The role of communication is widely recognised as a valuable tool for the implementation of modern monetary policy, but research has tended to focus more on the effects of the actions of central banks, rather than their communication. A numerical index was constructed to reflect the monetary policy inclination communicated by the SARB's MPC statements. This index was applied in a number of ways to investigate the nature and success of the communication of the SARB. Exploratory data analysis and formal econometric tests revealed commendable consistency in the communication contained in the MPC statements, which was supported by more formal regression analyses. Our evidence suggests that the MPC has succeeded in signalling its likely future policy decisions with admirable consistency over this period. 
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